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Political Consequences of Conspiratorial Thinking: Evidence from 2016 Italian 
Constitutional Referendum  
 
Abstract 
Recently, the literature has devoted increasing attention to beliefs in conspiracy theories. 
Among various aspects of the phenomenon, it was found that conspiratorial attitudes are 
associated with political behaviour. In Italy, previous research found that Five Stars 
Movement and right-wing parties voters tend to show higher levels of conspiratorial thinking 
than other voters. However, the relationship between conspiracism and vote choice remains 
obscure. By analysing an Italian panel survey data collected before and after 2016 
constitutional referendum, we show that the belief in conspiracy theories is associated with 
referendum vote choices, even when controlling for partisan opinions, leaders' evaluations, 
and perceived economic wealth. Moreover, the effect of conspiracism on referendum vote 
choice proves to be stronger among the supporters of the government, which promoted the 
referendum. This paper aims at shedding light on the processes of opinion formation and how 
these are affected by external attitudes, such as conspiratorial ones.  
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 2 
Introduction 
Conspiracy theories, defined as explanations of social facts by means of “secret 
arrangement[s] between a small group of actors to usurp political or economic power, violate 
established rights, hide vital secrets or illicitly cause widespread harm” (Uscinski et al. 2016, 
p. 58), have been spread throughout the history of every culture. The growing academic 
literature on conspiracism - the attitude of believing in conspiracy theories - has outlined that 
the presence of conspiracist attitudes among the public is not a new phenomenon. Nonetheless, 
the more pronounced attention among pundits and scholars can be explained by two 
fundamental reasons. First, the diffusion of conspiracist ideation appears in contrast with the 
diffusion of education and generalised scientific knowledge: the ease with which individuals 
can access information - usually uncontrolled by the communities of experts - aids the 
propensity of people to elaborate and assimilate alternative epistemologies - which are usually 
consistent with their previous stereotypes and prejudices (Plencner, 2014). Second, the 
diffusion of conspiracy theories - or, at least, the fact that these theories are still present 
nowadays - is gaining growing interest since it appears associated with anti-establishment 
rhetoric and success of populist parties (Castanho-Silva et al., 2017; Mancosu et al., 2017). 
Recent research has shown the extent to which believing in conspiracy theories is common 
in contemporary Western democracies and tried to identify the factors explaining the 
propensity to endorse these theories. In particular, we can identify two main research lines. The 
first one belongs to psychological studies, which analyse the relationship between conspiracism 
and more or less severe forms of psychopathology (Darwin et al., 2011; Barron et al., 2014). 
A second line of research, on the other side, has investigated conspiracism from a 
sociological/political science perspective, aiming at finding associations between conspiracy 
beliefs and other attitudinal or socio-demographic variables (Oliver and Wood, 2014; Van 
Proojien, 2017). Nonetheless, in the literature conspiracism has mainly been intended as a 
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 3 
dependent variable, namely, the phenomenon that has to be explained by other elements taken 
as drivers. In other words, to date, the literature has mainly focused on assessing whether 
believing in conspiracy theories could be explained by political attitudes and behaviors 
concerning divisive issues (e.g., Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Castanho-Silva et al., 2017), but 
little research has focused on assessing whether conspirational attitudes are able to predict 
certain political behaviors. 
Our paper aims at addressing this issue, by employing as a case study the decision that 
Italian voters were called to take for the constitutional referendum of December 4, 2016. The 
referendum aimed at confirming a radical reform of the institutional structure of the state 
(Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017; Tsebelis, 2017), which included the reduction of powers of 
the Senate, the replacement of its direct elected members with representatives of regional and 
local authorities, and a series of other changes aimed at speeding the legislative process.  
In particular, two elements related to the context in which the referendum was held must be 
stressed. First, the referendum was promoted by the government in office, and government 
parties have been the main, and most important subjects having campaigned actively for Yes 
vote; on the other side, all the opposition parties campaigned for No vote. In the context of top-
down national referenda, and especially when the issues at stake are complex, it has been shown 
that partisanship might represent a powerful cue, allowing people to vote without having to 
understand every detail of the issue at stake, by merely aligning to the decision suggested by 
the party they support and trust in (Hobolt, 2007; Quaranta et al., 2019). After 2016 Italian 
constitutional referendum various studies showed that the vast majority of voters aligned to the 
decision of the parties they supported (Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018; Negri and Rebessi, 2018). 
The second element to be stressed is represented by an interesting feature of the referendum 
campaign: one of the main arguments of the No supporters was that the reform would have 
produced an authoritarian drift, by altering the checks and balances of the original Constitution, 
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 4 
sometimes suggesting that this reform might have been consistent with what desired by obscure 
powers to weaken Italian democracy (Zagrebelsky and Pallante, 2016). As we will show in 
detail, these conspiracy theories have not been spread by marginal and peripheral outsiders or 
only occasionally included in the public conversation on constitutional reform. They have been 
a key element in framing constitutional reform by important political actors in the campaign 
for voting No. This phenomenon has been asymmetrical, since nothing similar happened on 
the opposite side. We will argue that similar arguments might be particularly appealing for 
people more prone to believe in conspiracies, irrespective from their political predispositions. 
The paper shows that conspiracist ideation is associated with lower propensities of voting Yes 
in the referendum and that this also holds when controlling for the other significant predictor 
of the referendum vote, party support. Also, we show that voters who support the government 
present a dramatic decrease in their likelihood to vote Yes in the referendum when they score 
high on the conspiracism scale. This evidence sheds new light on the nature of conspiratorial 
attitudes, showing that conspiracism in Italy represents an independent and strong predictor of 
political choices, and is somewhat a separated concept from the simple party choice. Our 
analysis also suggests that conspiratorial attitudes can be exploited by campaign strategies 
purposely aimed to activate those predispositions. 
 
Determinants and Consequences of Conspiratorial Thinking 
Counter-intuitively with respect to the growing relevance of scientific thinking, average 
level of education in the population, and access to official and reliable information, conspiracist 
ideation is still present in public opinion of contemporary democracies. A recent national 
representative survey has shown that 50% of Americans believe in at least one conspiracy 
theories among the most spread in the U.S, such as the government’s complicity in 9/11 attacks 
as a justification for declaring war to the Middle East or the Wall Street’s premeditation of 
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 5 
eliciting the financial crisis to increase its control over the world economy (Oliver and Wood, 
2014). Analogously, Mancosu et al. (2017) found that 47% of the Italian respondents to an opt-
in web survey declare to believe in at least one out of four conspiracy theories. As a matter of 
fact, conspiracism is not a marginal phenomenon. 
As stressed above, the academic literature dealing with conspiracist ideation can be roughly 
subdivided into two main lines of research. The first and the older one is the psychological 
literature. Most of this research focused on the factors aimed at predicting belief in conspiracy 
theories, by outlining that conspiracism is more spread among people suffering from 
psychopathologies like paranoia and schizotypy (Darwin et al., 2011; Barron et al., 2014). 
Since this perspective appears too narrow to explain belief in conspiracy theories, others argued 
that conspiracism is not only related to clinical paranoia, but to a paranoid style of thinking 
according to which an individual "sees the hostile and conspiratorial world in which he feels 
himself to be living as directed […] against a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate does 
not affect himself alone but millions of others." (Hofstadter, 1996, p. 4). According to the latter 
interpretation, people believing in conspiracy theories are expected to adopt a Manichean 
perspective where few conspirators are identified with the Evil and millions of individuals with 
the Good. Moreover, social psychology found out that lower levels of self-esteem and 
agreeableness, as well as high levels of anomie, powerlessness, and authoritarianism, are 
associated to higher levels of conspiracism (Abalakina et al., 1999; Swami et al., 2011). 
Other studies investigated whether conspiracism is socially patterned, regardless of 
personality and psychological traits. Education proves to be negatively related to conspiracism 
since it is expected that more educated people are more used to adopt rational thinking, and 
then to avoid obscure interpretation of facts (Oliver and Wood, 2014, Van Proojien, 2017, in 
Italy Mancosu et al., 2017). Moreover, Makarovs and Achterberg (2017) found that highly 
educated people are more likely to be anti-vaccine in high-advanced than in low-advanced 
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societies, giving some room to the recent signals of scepticism toward scientific thought in 
post-industrial societies. By arguing that religiosity shares with conspiracism a predisposition 
in providing a supernatural explanation of events, Mancosu and colleagues (2017) even show 
that more religious people are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories.   
Since conspiracies are rooted in the world of politics, the renewed interest in conspiracy 
theories has inevitably involved also political scientists, aimed at studying whether believing 
in those theories is politically patterned, namely, associated to some political attitudes and 
characteristics. Previous studies have shown that conspiracism is negatively associated with 
political trust (Einstein and Glick, 2015, Miller et al., 2016, Mancosu et al., 2017) and political 
engagement (Jolley and Douglas, 2014). Moreover, Miller et al. (2016) found that among 
individuals with low levels of trust conspiracism is more spread when the level of political 
sophistication is high. 
When looking at partisanship or ideology as determinants of conspiracy ideation, it is 
relevant to distinguish between ideological and general conspiracy theories. The former 
identifies the conspirators with specific partisan actors and is ideologically oriented (Oliver 
and Wood, 2014). When dealing with such theories partisanship and ideology prove to be 
strong predictors of their belief. For instance, Republicans and conservatives are more likely 
to believe that Barack Obama was not born in the U.S. (Pasek et al., 2015) and that his 
administration manipulated official statistics on the labour market (Einstein and Glick, 2015) 
than Democrats and liberals. On the contrary, Democrats are more prone to believe that George 
Bush Jr. was complicit in 9/11 attacks (Cassino and Jenkins, 2013). 
Contrary to ideological conspiracy theories, general conspiracy theories do not identify the 
conspirator with a specific political actor, but more generally with individuals or organisations 
not associated with a particular ideological position. While in the US no relevant differences 
in conspiracy theories beliefs are detected between liberals and conservatives (Oliver and 
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Wood, 2014), previous research coming from the European context found a positive 
relationship between (left and right) political extremism and belief in such general conspiracies 
(Van Proojien et al., 2015). In particular, it was argued that political extremists tend to have a 
structured style of thinking aimed at explaining every event; thus, conspiracy theories help 
them in providing straightforward solutions. Italian data partially confirmed those findings, by 
reporting higher belief in conspiracy theories among the far-right individuals but not among 
the far-left ones (Mancosu et al., 2017). Moreover, differently from the U.S. where no 
relationship between general conspiracism and partisanship was detected, in Italy conspiracism 
proves to be more spread among supporters of populist parties, like the Five Star Movement 
and the Northern League (Mancosu et al., 2017). This result, consistent with Hofstadter's 
(1996) argument, indirectly suggests a shared trait between the concepts of conspiracism and 
populism, as long as they both imply a worldview where people are the victims of very few 
individuals (Castanho-Silva et al., 2017).   
In previous literature, as stressed above, conspiracism is usually the dependent variable, that 
is, it is intended as an individual characteristic that is explained by other, exogenous, 
characteristics. Conspiracism is thus associated with partisanship (Enders and Smallpage, 
2019), left-right self-placement (van Proojien et al., 2015), populist attitudes (Mancosu et al., 
2017), and vote choice (Uscinski and Parent, 2014). However, when considering elections 
where individuals do not have to vote for parties or candidates, but for specific issues like in 
referenda, conspiracism could play a role even in predicting voting behavior, whenever one of 
the options might be somehow interpreted by voters within the framework of conspiracy 
theories. 2016 Italian constitutional referendum represents an exceptional case study because 
during the electoral campaign the No option was also advocated based on conspiracy 
narratives. 
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The Italian Constitutional Referendum: Context and Hypotheses 
In recent years, referenda have been rapidly gaining importance in European politics: the 
Italian constitutional referendum of December 4, 2016 shares various similarities with other 
relevant referenda held in the same period, such as the British referendum on Brexit (June 23, 
2016) and the one on the independence of Catalonia (October 1, 2017), although they dealt 
with different subjects and took place on the basis of different legal assumptions. First, the 
result of the popular consultation had or might have had a significant impact on the domestic 
and European political stability. Second, the clash between those who were favourable and 
those opposing to the proposal has been very hard. Third, in all three cases it has been 
hypothesized that one or both parties in competition have spread conspiracy theories in support 
of their position and doubts have been advanced that foreign powers might have attempted to 
influence the outcome fueling conspiracy theories and fake news through the social media 
(Aro, 2016; Persily, 2017; Biden and Carpenter, 2017; Burgess, 2018). Indeed, the employment 
of referenda as tests for conspiracy ideation influence on voters’ choice is not unique to the 
2016 Italian constitutional referendum. For instance, Swami and colleagues (2018) show that 
belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories is positively associated with voting for the Brexit in 
the 2016 UK referendum. According to their argument, conspiratorial thinking on the 
Islamization of European Union implies negative attitudes toward European integration, then 
leading to voting for Leave. However, the study employs a measure of ideological conspiracism 
which is ideologically associated with one of the two voting options.  
As far as the Italian case is concerned, the promoters and supporters of the constitutional 
reform quite exclusively used pragmatic arguments. According to them, by abolishing the 
almost unique form of perfectly symmetrical bicameralism unintentionally designed by the 
Constituent Assembly members (Vassallo, 2015), as already unsuccessfully tried several times 
in recent Italian political history (Vassallo, 1998, 2005), and transforming the Senate into a 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 9 
chamber representative of the local authorities, the reform would have led to a more 
straightforward, faster and more effective legislative process. The government would have had 
a timely response from the Parliament on its legislative proposals and would have had to submit 
itself to more stringent limitations on the use of the emergency decrees. Also, the reform would 
have clarified the respective responsibilities of the State and the Regions, by limiting 
unnecessary complications for citizens or economic actors and reducing litigation at the 
Constitutional Court. Finally, the reform would have substantially reduced the number of MPs 
and abolished, or made not anymore compulsory, institutions unanimously considered useless, 
such as the provinces or the Cnel, a body conceived by the constituent fathers as the seat of the 
dialogue between trade unions, employers and government (Rubechi, 2016). 
It is worth mention that the reform was considered by the then Prime Minister and 
Democratic Party leader, Matteo Renzi, as a crucial element of his plan for the modernisation 
of Italy. In an early stage of the referendum campaign, he stated that in case of defeat he would 
have resigned. His opponents were keen in exploiting this statement accusing him to treat the 
constitution as a personal matter, by spreading the perception that the reform was designed for 
securing a disciplined parliamentary majority in his hand, and twisting the meaning of the 
popular consultation into a referendum about Renzi himself, his policy and his temperament 
(Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017). 
According to critics of the reform, it would have led to an unjustified re-centralisation of 
some of the powers partially transferred to the Regions by a reform approved in 2001. The 
constitutional reform was criticised for being bungled, confused, poorly written, and 
unlawfully proposed by the Government rather than by the Members of Parliament (Pasquino, 
2016). The most penetrating criticism concerned the combination of the reform of the Senate 
contained in the constitutional reform with the new electoral law proposed for the Chamber of 
Deputies. The combination of the two reforms would have allowed the most voted party to 
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obtain with absolute certainty the absolute majority of the seats and, as a consequence, its leader 
to constitute and guide the Government. This was considered a virtue by the proponents, 
according to recurrent claims in the Italian public discourse in favour of a majority-assuring 
system, which means institutional and electoral systems able to favour the formation of a 
durable and cohesive government around the most voted party or coalition and make the 
elections decisive (D'Alimonte, 2015). On the contrary, several politicians and eminent 
academics accused the project of preluding to an "authoritarian turn", which would have 
undermined the system of check and balances of the original, post-war constitution 
(Zagrebelsky and Pallante, 2016).  
 Alongside this non-veiled criticism of an authoritarian risk, some supporters of the No 
option also spread explicit conspiracy theories, that is narratives where an evil elite/small 
power group aimed at subverting the previous order to gain power, conceiving the harmful 
strategy in the darkness and having the complicity of subordinate politicians to implement it. 
In some cases, such theories were spread by active influencers able to reach specific niches of 
the public trough the social and/or traditional broadcast media. For instance, according to 
Antonio Ingroia, a former public prosecutor, founder and leader of the far-left party Civil 
Revolution dissolved in 2013, the reform followed the program of the secret Masonic lodge P2 
which was active under the lead of Licio Gelli in the ‘70s (Ingroia, 2016). According to Diego 
Fusaro, a well-known young pundit, the reform would have been written based on indications 
contained in a report by the multinational investment bank J. P. Morgan (Fusaro, 2016). It is 
worth mention that both Fusaro and Ingroia have been recurrent collaborators for the 
newspaper ‘Il Fatto Quotidiano’ and its online blog, that is the one of the most influential source 
of information for the 5 Stars Movement’s activists.  
During the referendum campaign, the same kind of arguments were also expressed by 
notorious intellectual personalities. For instance, Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Professor Emeritus of 
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Constitutional Law, former President of the Constitutional Court, and one of the leading figures 
in the referendum campaign for No vote1, in a document jointly signed with other famous 
intellectuals and academics claimed that the reform “servilely implements the explicit 
indications of the most important American business bank, JP Morgan, who wrote in a 2013 
document that Italy should have got rid of some 'problems' deriving from to the fact that its 
Constitution is too 'socialist'”2.  
These positions were also spread by several politicians. Alessandro Di Battista, one of the 
few national leading figures in the Five Star Movement and one of the most active in the 
campaign for No vote, repeatedly and intensively stressed that “ECB, European Commission, 
J.P.Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Rating Agencies [...] agree[...] to amend a Constitution that in its 
principles actually fights precisely the primacy of finance over politics and the supremacy of 
the market over rights.”3. Furthermore, the Five Stars Movement’s spokespersons in the 
Chamber of Deputies, together with the Five Stars Movement’s MP Elio Lannutti, made a 
formal request for a judicial inquiry on the alleged conspiracy. As reported by the official blog 
of the party (Il Blog delle Stelle - The Stars’ Blog) on November 17, 2016,4 “Adusbef5 and the 
Five Stars Movement spokespersons, who filed a complaint with the Rome Prosecutor's Office 
on 12 October 2016 also suggesting the crime of high treason, have traced at least 10 very solid 
clues, to substantiate and testify the JP Morgan's hand in amending the Constitution, which 
being 'too socialist', hinders the economic action of business bankers, who would like to impose 
the hegemony of paper finance and money out of nothing, on democratic systems based on 
popular sovereignty, conditioning the Renzi government to pass liberticide laws against 
workers' rights and achievements, beginning with the Jobs Act .”  
The conspiratorial framework has thus been a key element in the campaign for No vote of 
several figures on the far left, of leading intellectuals, and of the main political force opposing 
the reform. 
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The referendum results were pretty clear, with a solid loss of Yes, which obtained about 40% 
of votes and was followed as expected by the resignation of the main sponsor of the reform. 
As pointed out above, the government parties campaigned for Yes vote at the referendum, 
while all the other political forces (the radical left, the centre-right and right parties, and the 
Five Stars Movement) campaigned for No vote. This sharp differentiation between a 
government supporting Yes vote and an opposition supporting No vote to the reform led to a 
strong politicisation of the positions toward the referendum also among the electoral body. 
Survey data by the Italian National Election Studies (Itanes) confirm this quite clear trend since 
most of the respondents expressed a vote consistent with the position officially held by the 
party they declared to support (Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018). However, as pointed out above, 
in addition to partisan cues the argument of the "authoritarian turn" and the concerns about the 
reform as consistent with the desires of mysterious powers and even of subversive 
organisations could have affected the final result. 
 
Hypotheses 
We have pointed out that in Italy there is a sharp difference between believers and non-
believers in conspiracy theories in term of party preferences, with people supporting right-wing 
parties and the Five Stars Movement having significantly higher likelihoods of believing in 
conspiracy theories than government supporters. Moreover, we have stressed that political 
entrepreneurs of right-wing/populist parties have employed a conspiracist style of 
communication over the last decades (see Mancosu et al. 2017). Therefore, one might argue 
that in the Italian context conspiracism and support for right-wing/populist parties are two 
endogenous concepts, which cannot be analytically subdivided and analysed independently. 
2016 Italian constitutional referendum, thus, gives us an exceptional opportunity of testing this 
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issue, by empirically assessing also vote choice of people presenting inconsistent 
characteristics (such as conspiracists supporting government parties and vice versa). 
First, however, we must assess whether people more favourable to accept conspiratorial 
thinking (and thus to accept more easily a narrative in which small, influential groups aim at 
gaining benefits at the detriment of the collective through obscure actions) are actually more 
prone to try to oppose the reform. The first hypothesis will thus read as follows. 
 
Hp1. The higher the level of conspiracism, the lower the likelihood of Yes voting. 
 
Since in Italy conspiracism is more spread among people supporting those parties that were 
in opposition at the time of the referendum, we might see an effect of conspiracism on 
referendum vote just because a specific type of voter is both a conspiracist and a supporter of 
opposition parties. According to our expectations, thus, the second hypothesis will read as 
follow. 
 
Hp2. As long as conspiracism increases, the likelihood of Yes voting decreases, independently 
from the party one supports. 
 
Finally, we might ask ourselves whether there is some form of asymmetry between political 
camps in the effect exerted by conspiracism on the referendum vote choice. In other words, we 
might ask ourselves whether the effect of conspiracism is stronger in the government or in the 
opposition camp. In this case, we do not have a clear expectation about the possible differences 
that might arise in conspiracism effect according to the exogenous political affiliation of voters. 
Research question 1, thus, reads as follows: 
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RQ1. Is the effect of conspiracism on referendum choice stronger among the government or 
opposition supporters? 
 
RQ1 allows us to testing whether conspiratorial thinking interacts with party support when 
explaining vote choice at 2016 constitutional referendum, having further evidence that 
conspiracism represents an analytically separated concept with respect to partisanship or party 
support. 
 
Empirical Analysis: Methods and Results 
Data 
We test our hypotheses on data coming from the Italian National Election Study (ITANES) 
pre-post Referendum panel. Interviews were collected shortly before (between October 26-31, 
2016, N = 3,007) and after (December 7-13, 2016, N = 3,027) the referendum of December 4,  
2016, employing the Computer Assisted Web Interview (CAWI) mode. Respondents were 
collected from an opt-in community of a private research company (SWG) and are stratified 
by gender, age, and macro-regional distribution of the Italian population. Overall, 2,843 
citizens were interviewed both in the pre- and in the post-referendum waves. 
 
Variables and Models 
The dependent variable is represented by self-reported voting behaviour in the referendum 
measured in the post-electoral wave (classified as 1 "Voted yes", 0 "Voted no"). People who 
did not declare their vote in the referendum were not included in the analysis. Concerning vote 
choice in the constitutional referendum, sample data pretty resemble official data: among 
respondents who declared to have voted, 39% choose the Yes option, while the other 61% 
opted for No (41% vs 59% according to official voting data) 
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To avoid issues of endogeneity, all the independent variables were collected in the pre-
referendum wave. The main independent variable is represented by the individual strength of 
belief in conspiracy theories. Respondents were asked to assess the plausibility of different 
conspiracy theories or ideas, using a 0–10 scale where 0 means "Not plausible at all" and 10 
means "Completely plausible." In particular, the interview included an assessment of four 
statements referring to conspiracy theories that have featured in public debate in recent years 
(see Mancosu et al., 2017) plus two more attitudinal items measuring conspiracist ideation, 
inspired by the generic conspiracist beliefs scale (Brotherton et al., 2013). The statements read 
as follows: 
1) ‘Moon landings never happened, and the proofs have been fabricated by NASA and the US 
government.’ (mean = 3.03, % answers from 6 to 10 = 24.6, n = 2,622) 6 
2) ‘Vapor trails left by aircraft are actually chemical agents deliberately sprayed in a clandestine 
program directed by government officials.’ (mean = 2.95, % answers from 6 to 10 = 25.0, n = 
2,587) 
3) ‘Vaccines harm the immune system and expose it to diseases.’ (mean = 3.39, % answers 
from 6 to 10 = 29.3, n = 2,609) 
4) ‘The Stamina method invented by Davide Vannoni for curing neurodegenerative diseases 
has been obstructed by big pharmaceutical groups.’ (mean = 4.93, % answers from 6 to 10 = 
48.6, n = 2,527) 
5) ‘A relevant part of our lives is controlled by conspiracies organised by major powers.’ (mean 
= 5.45, % answers from 6 to 10 = 54.8, n = 2,663) 
6) ‘Election results are made up in order not to let people against major powers to win.’ (mean 
= 5.10, % answers from 6 to 10 = 48.8, n = 2,634) 
The six conspiracist items present a high internal consistency. The average inter-item 
correlation is 0.55, and the Cronbach alpha is 0.88 (further, none of the items displays 
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anomalies compared to the others). An additional factor analysis was carried out and shows the 
same results, with loadings of the first factor extracted on the six items of comparable and 
substantial size (all above .70). This suggests, as in other works on similar data (see Mancosu 
et al., 2017), that the items contribute to form a latent trait expressing a general propensity to 
believe in conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2017). It is thus possible to combine the items to 
compute a 0-10 conspiracism scale by summing each score of the items employed and then 
dividing by the number of items. Descriptive statistics further show that conspiracism is not a 
marginal phenomenon since both the mean and the median of the scale computed on 2,343 
respondents who gave valid answers to all the six items prove to be around 4. 
The second relevant independent predictor that we take into account is the individual party 
preference (voting intention if a National election would have taken place soon). According to 
previous studies, indeed, believing in conspiracy theories is a prerogative of people supporting 
certain parties (mainly the Northern League, the Five Stars Movement and Forza Italia), which 
are the same parties that campaigned for voting No in the referendum. As a result, one might 
argue that the relation between conspiracism and vote choice in the referendum could represent 
a composition effect, being a significant share of right-wing or Five Stars Movement supporters 
those who are more likely to be conspiracists and to vote No in the referendum. The variable 
has been coded in such a way that 0 "Other parties/Don't know/No answer/Undecided" 1 
"Government parties" (Democratic Party - PD and New Centre-Right - NCD) 2 "Main 
opposition parties" (Five Stars Movement, Forza Italia, Northern League, Brothers of Italy, 
Italian Left).   
A number of control variables representing possible confounders have been added to the 
models: educational level (subdivided into “Low”, “Medium” and “High”), age, gender, 
geopolitical zone (subdivided into “North-west”, “North-east”, “Red zone” and “Center/South 
and islands”), trust in the democratic procedures (3-items on a 0-10 scale where 0 indicates the 
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lowest level of trust, inspired from the stealth democracy scale, see Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 
20027), retrospective familiar economic evaluation (0-4 scale where 0 means “much worsened” 
and 4 “much improved”), and evaluation of Renzi’s government performance in improving 
individuals’ home area conditions (0-10 scale where 0 means “totally negative” and 10 means 
“totally positive”). 
We will test our hypotheses using a set of logistic regression models. Model 1 will include 
only the control variables specified above, and Model 2 will introduce the conspiracism scale 
to test Hp1 systematically. Model 3 will insert in the model party preferences, by testing 
systematically whether the possible effect of conspiracism also holds when we take into 
account vote choice in a hypothetical election (Hp2). Finally, to answer RQ1, model 4 will 
investigate the asymmetries of the effect of conspiracism on vote choice, separately in the 
opposition and government camps: the model will thus be fitted by interacting the party 
preference and the conspiracism scale. 
 
Results 
Table 1 presents the models employed to test our hypotheses. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
As it is possible to see in Model 1, many control variables contribute to predicting the 
likelihood of having voted Yes in the referendum (the pseudo-R-squared, only considering 
controls, is equal to 0.27). In particular, being middle- and high-educated increases the 
likelihood of supporting the constitutional reform, as well as being older and coming from the 
north-west of the country. Furthermore, retrospective economic evaluations and the perceived 
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performance of Renzi's government in the home area are positively correlated with Yes 
support, consistent with Di Mauro and Memoli (2018) 
Model 2 taps the first hypothesis of our paper. By adding the conspiracist scale among the 
independent variables the pseudo-R-squared moves from 0.27 to 0.31. Moreover, the 
regression coefficient of the conspiracism scale is negative and significant. By calculating 
average marginal effects, we can say that every additional point of the conspiracist scale is 
associated with a decrease in the likelihood of voting Yes of 3.9 percentage points. This 
confirms our Hp1. 
Hypothesis 2 aims at assessing whether this relationship also holds if we take into account 
the party preferences. As shown in Model 3, the effect of party preference is highly significant 
and consistent with what expected: people supporting government parties (PD and NCD) are 
more likely to vote Yes with respect to the reference category ("Other parties/Don't know/No 
answer/Undecided") whilst people supporting opposition parties have dramatically lower 
likelihoods to vote Yes (the predicted probabilities of voting Yes for Government and 
opposition parties supporters are respectively of 71% and 27%, with nonvoters/undecided 
around 38%). The model, however, shows that conspiracism effect is still negative and 
significant, although reduced in magnitude (using average marginal effect calculation, at every 
additional point of the conspiracist scale, we see a decrease the likelihood of voting Yes by 2.6 
percentage points). This confirms our Hp2. 
 
Interactions Between Party Support and Conspiracism 
We have stressed so far, and confirmed by testing Hp2, that although related (see Mancosu 
et al., 2017), conspiracism and support for right-wing parties and Five Stars Movement are two 
different dimensions of political behaviour: first, because right-wing/Five Stars Movement 
voters present only an enhanced likelihood to endorse conspiracies, but there are also 
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conspiracists among the left of the political spectrum; second, because when confronted with 
a political decision such in the 2016 constitutional referendum, both conspiracism and party 
preferences contribute significantly in predicting individual vote choice (see Model 3). Model 
3, however, does not show us how the two variables interact. In other words, we do not know 
whether the effect of conspiracism on referendum vote choice varies depending on the party 
one supports. To overcome this issue, we have fitted a two-way interaction between the 
conspiracism scale and party preference (see Model 4). Interaction effects in logistic regression 
models cannot be interpreted by merely looking at the coefficient of the interaction term, but 
they can be better assessed by reporting the average marginal effects (Ai and Norton, 2003). 
Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities of voting Yes in the referendum by support for 
government/opposition parties and conspiracism. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
In the left part of the graph, namely for lower scores of the conspiracism scale, the 
difference between government and opposition supporters is significant, with about 9 out of 10 
government parties' supporters voting Yes against about less than 40% of opposition supporters 
voting No. As long as conspiracism increases, however, both the curves drop rapidly, until the 
difference between conspiracists supporting the government and the opposition becomes 
substantially smaller, although still significant. This massive drop, especially for what concerns 
government supporters, suggests to us that the role of conspiratorial attitudes has been crucial 
in shaping the referendum results, especially for what concerns government supporters. People 
who were expected to support the constitutional reform because of their party attachment, 
indeed, defected massively from voting Yes in the case they scored high on the conspiracism 
scale, arguably expecting that the referendum could represent a way in which the democracy 
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could have been endangered. This evidence substantially answers to our RQ1, being the 
magnitude of the conspiracism effect much larger for what concerns pro-government 
conspiracist people. 
Two counter-arguments can be made against this evidence. The first is that the variable 
measuring party preference includes very different political actors within the category 
"opposition parties"; therefore, the employment of a more refined measure might lead to 
different results. In Appendix, we account for this possible drawback by employing a variable 
where the "opposition parties" category is split into the three following categories: left 
opposition parties (Italian Left), Five Stars Movement, and right opposition parties (Forza 
Italia, Northern League, and Brothers of Italy). Figure A1 (see full models in Table A1) shows 
that for individuals supporting the Five Star Movement and right opposition parties the 
predicted probabilities of voting Yes is pretty similar at every level of conspiracism; among 
supporters of left opposition parties a more noticeable gap in the likelihood of voting Yes is 
detected between respondents with higher and lower levels of conspiracism. Nonetheless, 
overall patterns of predicted probabilities at different levels of conspiracism prove not to be 
significantly different depending on the opposition party one supports. This finding allows 
giving more leverage to the empirical evidence shown in Figure 1. 
The second possible drawback comes from the crucial role played by the former Prime 
Minister Matteo Renzi in the referendum campaign, as stressed above. Besides party support, 
Renzi's evaluation was supposed to affect the referendum choice, although previous research 
found that when controlling for government's evaluation and party closeness Renzi's evaluation 
was not significantly associated with vote choice (Di Mauro and Memoli, 2018). When looking 
at the significant negative effect of conspiracism on Yes vote among supporters of government 
parties (Figure 1), one could hypothetically argue that individuals with conspiratorial attitudes 
supporting the government parties are more likely to evaluate the Prime Minister negatively, 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 21 
and consequently to vote No. Moving from Model 3, we have run a further logistic regression 
model (see Table 1, Model 5) by adding an interaction term between Renzi's evaluation 
(dichotomized measure from an original 0-10 scale, where negative evaluation is associated 
with 0 to 5 scores, and positive evaluation to 6 to 10 ones) and conspiracism. As Figure 2 
shows, the negative effect of conspiracism on voting Yes is far higher among individuals who 
provide a positive evaluation of Matteo Renzi. Among respondents presenting positive 
attitudes towards the Prime Minister, the predicted probability of voting Yes is 83% when the 
level of conspiracism is equal to 0, while it dramatically lowers to 17% when the level of 
conspiracism is equal to 10. The pattern is similar to the one identified in the interaction 
between conspiracism and party support and shows the strong effect of conspiracism in 
determining the vote in the referendum even when supporting the leader promoting the reform, 
net of party preference. 
To sum, robustness checks confirm our finding: even when supporting a party endorsing the 
Yes vote in the referendum, on average, conspiratorial attitudes have pushed individuals away 
from the vote choice suggested by the party they are closest to, and this happened in particular 
for supporters of the government. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we exploited the case of December 4, 2016 Italian constitutional referendum 
to assess whether the relationship between conspiracism and vote choice in this case is fully 
mediated by party preference, or whether conspiracism represents an independent predictor of 
voting behaviour. 
Conspiracism is an important element of the cognitive structure underlying people's 
attitudes and behaviours. Previous literature has shown that it is correlated with psychological, 
socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics. It has also been shown that conspiracism is 
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associated with political orientations, party identifications and party support. In the latter 
respect, a comparative analysis of the literature shows big differences across countries: if in 
the US there are no large differences in believing in generic conspiracy theories between liberal 
and conservatives (Oliver and Wood, 2014), in the Netherlands conspiracists are more likely 
to be found in both the left and right extremes of the ideological spectrum (Van Prooijen et al., 
2015). In Italy, the situation is further different, featuring more conspiracist people as those 
who declare to vote for right-wing parties and the Five Stars Movement (Mancosu et al., 2017). 
Such a strict relationship between voting for populist/right-wing parties and high level of 
conspiracism - together with the fact that recently right-wing and populist parties in Italy have 
exploited in their communication the spread of a conspiracist mentality - might suggest that, in 
such a context, the two concepts are somewhat overlapping, or, at least, that the conspiracist 
mentality is a concept inherent in support of certain parties. 
We showed that the referendum was a highly politicised vote which contrasted the 
government parties (supporting Yes vote to the reform) and the centre-right parties and the 
Five Stars Movement (supporting No vote). We also argued that one of the most crucial 
argument for No vote was that the reform would have led to an "authoritarian turn", stressing 
that part of the reform was similar to what desired several decades ago by the Masonic Lodge 
P2 - leading us to imagine that people more favourable to adopt conspiratorial thinking might 
be more prone to vote against the reform because of this argument. The combination of these 
two elements (the political and the conspiracist ones) gives us the exceptional opportunity of 
evaluating what are the characteristics of a highly politicised behaviour that also presents a 
conspiratorial aspect. 
The set of logistic regression models presented in Table 1 shows quite clearly that 
conspiracism has a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of voting Yes in the 
referendum. This effect also holds if we take into account other socio-demographic variables 
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and voters' party preference - meaning that the effect of conspiracism is somewhat distinct from 
that of partisan attachment. 
One, however, might ask whether a conspiracist supporting the government parties will 
follow its partisan cues only, and conspiracism does not have any role in shaping the voting 
behaviour of such individuals. Using a two-way interaction, we show that conspiracism is a 
stronger predictor among government supporters, who witness a lowering in their propensity 
to vote Yes of about 50 percentage points from the lowest to the highest level of the 
conspiracism scale. The effect is lower for supporters of the opposition parties (a drop of about 
25 points). This evidence does not erase the higher likelihood to endorse conspiracy theories 
among right-wing parties and Five Stars Movement supporters. More simply, we show that 
conspiracist individuals who are supporters of both government and opposition parties present 
much similar voting behaviour with respect to non-conspiracist people. 
Conspiracy theories are playing a relevant role within the public opinion, and the 
opportunity for individuals to get in touch with them is becoming increasingly higher. 
Therefore, since those theories are strictly connected with the political sphere, conspiratorial 
attitudes and beliefs could have political consequences and affect vote choice. Our findings 
suggest that conspiratorial attitudes could be successfully exploited by communication 
strategies or electoral campaigns aimed at activating them, regardless of the individual political 
orientations. However, new research in other contexts is needed to provide further evidence 
towards the role played by conspiracism in determining voting behaviour when the election 
does not involve the choice for a specific party, but for specific issues like in referenda. Our 
suggestion for scholars is to look beyond the standard predictors of voting behaviour and to 
provide more attention to other candidates, such as conspiratorial beliefs, to give a broader 
explanatory framework. More in general, the electoral turmoil that has been taking place in 
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several Western countries in recent years probably necessitates new explanatory instruments 
from the ones having characterised the study of voting behaviour by now.   
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Notes 
1 During the referendum campaign, Gustavo Zagrebelsky was even involved in a tv-debate 
against Matteo Renzi, the leading figure in the campaign for Yes vote. The debate, broadcast 
on September 30, 2016, by the private channel La7, represented one of the most relevant media-
events of the campaign. 
2http://www.libertaegiustizia.it/2016/10/15/ancora-cinquanta-giorni-di-lotta-per-dire-no-ai-
nemici-della-costituzione-piu-bella-del-mondo/ 
3 https://www.facebook.com/960162547429143 
4http://www.ilblogdellestelle.it/2016/11/_la_riforma_la_vuole_la_jp_morgan_10_indizi_iodi
cono.html 
5 Adusbef is an association for consumers’ protection whose president was the MP Elio 
Lannutti. 
6 Descriptives are computed on the 2,843 individuals interviewed both in the pre- and in the 
post-referendum surveys. 
7 The three items are: parties are necessary to defend special interests of groups and social 
classes; parties guarantee that people can participate to politics in Italy; without parties there 
cannot be democracy. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Five logistic regression models with referendum vote as dependent variable (1: yes; 0: no) 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Educ. level: Middle (ref. Low) 0.42*** 0.24 0.41** 0.38** 0.35* 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
Educ. level: High 0.44** 0.08 0.11 0.09 -0.07 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) 
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender: Female (ref. Male) -0.16 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
Geopolitical area: Red zone (ref. Center/South) 0.03 -0.21 -0.20 -0.22 -0.25 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) 
Geopolitical area: North-west 0.39*** 0.22 0.26* 0.27* 0.23 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Geopolitical area: North-east 0.15 -0.12 0.01 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) 
Retrospective familiar economic evaluation (0-4) 0.48*** 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Government's evaluation on contextual economy (0-10) 0.47*** 0.49*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.30*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Stealth democracy scale (0-10) 0.01 -0.00 -0.06** -0.06** -0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Conspiracism scale (0-10)  -0.26*** -0.20*** -0.11** -0.10** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Party preference: Government parties (ref. Others/NV/DK)  1.93*** 2.91*** 1.50*** 
   (0.20) (0.37) (0.21) 
Party preference: Opposition parties   -0.68*** -0.39 -0.63*** 
   (0.14) (0.28) (0.15) 
Party preference: Goverment parties * Conspiracism    -0.26***  
    (0.08)  
Party preference: Opposition parties * Conspiracism    -0.09  
    (0.06)  
Renzi’s evaluation: Positive (ref: Negative)     2.94*** 
     (0.31) 
Renzi’s positive evaluation * Conspiracism     -0.35*** 
     (0.06) 
Constant -4.73*** -3.18*** -2.48*** -2.84*** -2.62*** 
 (0.34) (0.38) (0.41) (0.45) (0.44) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.31 0.40 0.40 0.47 
Observations 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,937 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of voting Yes, by party support (lines only plotted for government and opposition 
parties) and conspiracism level, estimated by model 4 (95% confidence intervals).  
 
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of voting Yes by Renzi's evaluation and conspiracism level, estimated by model 
5 (95% confidence intervals). 
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APPENDIX - ONLINE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
Table A1. Logistic regression models 3 and 4 with five-categories party preference variable.  
Independent variables Model 3A Model 4A 
Educ. level: Middle (ref. Low) 0.39** 0.38** 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
Educ. level: High 0.10 0.08 
 (0.20) (0.20) 
Age 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender: Female (ref. Male) -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
Geopolitical area: Red zone (ref. Center/South) -0.18 -0.20 
 (0.20) (0.20) 
Geopolitical area: North-west 0.27* 0.29* 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Geopolitical area: North-east 0.02 0.04 
 (0.20) (0.20) 
Retrospective familiar economic evaluation (0-4) 0.36*** 0.37*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
Government's evaluation on contextual economy (0-10) 0.37*** 0.38*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Stealth democracy scale (0-10) -0.07** -0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Conspiracism scale (0-10) -0.20*** -0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.05) 
Party preference: Government parties (ref. Others/NV/DK) 1.93*** 2.92*** 
 (0.20) (0.37) 
Party preference: Left opposition parties -0.39 0.61 
 (0.27) (0.49) 
Party preference: Five Stars Movement -0.73*** -0.77** 
 (0.17) (0.36) 
Party preference: Right opposition parties -0.74*** -0.43 
 (0.19) (0.38) 
Party preference: Goverment parties * Conspiracism  -0.26*** 
  (0.08) 
Party preference: Left Opposition parties * Conspiracism  -0.33** 
  (0.14) 
Party preference: Five Stars Movement * Conspiracism  -0.01 
  (0.08) 
Party preference: Right Opposition parties * Conspiracism  -0.09 
  (0.08) 
Constant -2.47*** -2.83*** 
 (0.42) (0.45) 
   
Pseudo R2 0.40 0.41 
Observations 1,952 1,952 
                            Standard errors in parentheses 
                            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A1. Predicted probabilities of voting Yes by party support (lines only plotted for government and 
opposition parties, split into three categories) and conspiracism level, estimated by model 4A (95% confidence 
intervals). 
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Reviewer 1 
A- First, although the authors never use the magic work "cause", there is some causal 
language in the paper (e.g. page 4, "conspiracy ideation leads to lower propensity..."; 
page 20 "driver of voting behavior"). Given that this is an observational study, and 
given the high potential for endogeneity (which the authors claim to solve by 
including controls and interactions, but this is unfortunately not the case, otherwise 
there would be no need for causal inference models) I would urge the authors to avoid 
all causal language and talk in terms of associations. 
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ANSWER: We thank Reviewer 1 for the comment. Although the variables measuring 
conspiracism were collected before the referendum to partially avoid endogeneity 
issues, we have revised the manuscript by toning down the causal language (revised 
text yellow-highlighted on pages 1, 18, 21, 22).  
 
B - Second, I think the authors should delve a bit more into the reason why 
conspiracism should be independently related to vote choice. In other words, I wish 
the discussion on pages 9-10 was more detailed, with some more examples and a 
clearer rationale linking the arguments used in the campaign with a generic 
conspiracist mentality. Was it really a campaign where mentioning conspiracy 
theories was extraordinarily common? I think this is important in order to justify an 
association between conspiracism and the vote which is independent from 
partisanship. 
 
ANSWER: We thank the reviewer for the comment, and we agree with him/her on the 
fact that the link between conspiracism, partisan attachment and 2016 referendum 
vote is not crystal clear. To clarify the argument, we added some more examples on 
the communication strategy that several opposition parties carried out during the 
campaign (see pages 10-11 of the manuscript and the answer to comment A of 
reviewer 2) and we specified better our most relevant expectation at page 12-13. In 
particular, in this additional part, we contest that 1) conspiracy theories are diffused in 
the Italian public opinion, and more prevalent among M5s and center-right voters; 2) 
that, however, also people who support the 2016 government present, to a lesser 
extent, high level of conspiracism. 3) that this inconsistency between the likelihood to 
believe in conspiracies and being exposed to a campaign that argues a conspiracy 
might lead conspiracists, pro-government people to be shifted toward the No vote (the 
same might hold for right-wing non-conspiracist voters). We think that restructuring 
this subsection dramatically increased the clarity of our argument. 
 
C- Minor point: In Table 1, Model 5, there must be a mistake in the table, because the 
main effect of Renzi's positive evaluation is negative, which makes no sense. 
 
ANSWER: We re-ran the regression model and we found that the main effect of 
Renzi’s evaluation has the same absolute value as before but it is positive, as 
suggested by Reviewer 1. We thank Reviewer 1 and, accordingly, corrected the 
mistake in Table 1. 
 
Reviewer 2 
 
A - The description of the case does not indicate exactly how widespread was the 
conspiracist framing of the "No" campaign. Without knowing much about this 
specific case, it reads more like a typical government v. opposition referendum, where 
narratives around the two sides might be eclipsed by the actors sponsoring it, and 
where voters mostly understand it as a confidence vote on the ruling parties. This is 
important because, in the absence of conspiracy narratives as the main discourse of 
the "No" campaign, there would be no theoretical expectation as to why conspiracism 
in itself should be a driver of vote choice, except for its correlation with other 
attitudes that predispose individuals against governments, such as anti-establishment 
and anti-government views and low political trust. In this scenario, conspiracism 
would play no theoretical role in explaining the vote. Therefore, the authors should 
expand more, perhaps with quotes and examples, on the specific conspiracy 
narratives used and how widespread they were in the overall campaign. 
 
ANSWER: The thank R2 for the comment. We followed R2 suggestion by largley 
restructuring the Background section. We added several examples from pundits, 
academics, and prominent political figures of parties supporting the No front (text 
yellow-highlighted on page 10-11). We believe that this restructuring largely 
increased the clarity of our argument. 
 
B - The paper should be restructured a bit, so that the research question appear before 
the hypotheses. Hypotheses are supposed to be potential answers to the RQ. 
 
ANSWER: We thank R2 for the suggestion. We have totally restructured the 
hypothesis section in order to make it sharper. We basically put the research question 
at the beginning of the section, and restructured the RQ, so that it clarifies better the 
sense of the two-way interaction between party support and conspiracism. 
 
C - People who didn't report their vote were dropped out: how many are those? Isn't 
this likely related to conspiracy beliefs? From Table 1 we see that there are fewer than 
2000 respondents in the final analysis, while the Data section says that more than 
2900 completed both waves. What happened to this ⅓ of the sample? Do the results 
hold if a more appropriate treatment of missing data is used (e.g., multiple 
imputation?) 
 
ANSWER: We thank Reviewer 2 for the comment, which allows explaining more in 
detail the procedure of data analysis. As reported in the Data section, 2,843 
respondents were interviewed both in the pre- and in the post-referendum survey. 
Therefore, since our research design aims at measuring all the independent variables 
before the vote in 2016 constitutional referendum, the sample employed to 
empirically test our hypotheses is made of these 2,843 individuals.  
The reason why the number of cases in regression analyses in equal to 1,952 is cases 
is only partially explained by the amount of missing cases for vote choice in the 
constitutional referendum (among the 2,843 pre-post panel respondents, 2,530 
declared to have voted yes or no at the referendum, while the remaining 313 declared 
not to have voted). As shown in Table R1, in which we report the number of valid 
cases for all the variables included in at least one of the regression models (see Table 
1 in the manuscript), there are some independent variables which present a relevant 
number of missing values, especially the conspiracism scale with 500 missing cases. 
The construction of the indexes of conspiracism and stealth employed in the 
regression models is based on a listwise deletion. To increase the number of cases in 
the regression models we could compute the two indexes by employing a pairwise 
deletion and imputing the mean of a certain item among the valid cases for those 
individuals presenting a missing value for that item. We used this procedure for both 
the scale of conspiracism and stealth, by imputing the mean of the item for missing 
values only for those individuals who provided a valid answer to at least one item for 
each scale. To provide a comparison between the model shown in the manuscript 
(with the two scales constructed by means of a listwise deletion) and a new model 
where the computation of the two scales followed the above described procedure, in 
Table R2 we estimated the same model for the different samples to test Hypothesis 1. 
Model 2 is the same shown in Table 1 in the manuscript. Model 2R is the same model 
estimated on a higher number of respondents (2,314) because in the construction of 
the two scales of conspiracism and stealth we employed a pairwise deletion and then 
an imputation of the missing values. As Table R2 shows, there are no substantial 
differences between the outputs of the two model, both in the values of the regression 
coefficients and in R-squared. To provide a more detailed comparison between the 
models, we need to compare the average marginal effects. An increase of 1 point in 
the conspiracism scale is associated with a decrease of 3.9 percentage points in Model 
2 and of 3.8 percentage points in Model 2R in the probability of having voted ‘yes’ at 
the constitutional referendum. Namely, the association between conspiracism and 
vote in 2016 referendum does not change between the two models. Similarly, increase 
of one-point in the scale of stealth democracy scale is associated to no decrease in the 
likelihood of voting ‘yes’ both in Model 2 and 2R. Also the other models (1, 3, 4, and 
5) substantially provide similar results between the two procedure (analyses available 
under request). Since we prefer to estimate the regression models only on those 
individuals who provided valid answers to all the variables, to avoid imputation of 
values which were not provided by the survey respondents, in the revised version of 
the manuscript we decided to keep the same models of the.first version. 
 
Table R1. Dependent variable and independent variables by valid cases. 
 
Variables Valid cases 
DV: Vote choice in 2016 referendum  2,530 
Educational level 2,843 
Age 2,843 
Gender 2,843 
Geopolitical area 2,843 
Retrospective familiar economic evaluation 2,820 
Government's evaluation on contextual economy  2,680 
Stealth democracy scale 2,624 
Conspiracism scale 2,343 
Party preference 2,843 
Renzi's evaluation 2,718 
Total sample  2,843 
 
 
Table R2. Logistic regression models with referendum vote as dependent variable (1: 
yes; 0: no) to test hypothesis 1. Model 2 is the one estimated in Table 1 in the 
manuscript, Model 2R employs pairwise deletion and imputation of missing values 
for the scales of conspiracism and stealth.  
 
Independent variables Model 2 Model 2R 
Educ. level: Middle (ref. Low) 0.24 0.22 
 (0.17) (0.15) 
Educ. level: High 0.08 0.15 
 (0.18) (0.17) 
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender: Female (ref. Male) 0.04 0.04 
 (0.12) (0.11) 
Geopolitical area: Red zone (ref. Center/South) -0.21 -0.17 
 (0.18) (0.16) 
Geopolitical area: North-west 0.22 0.21 
 (0.14) (0.13) 
Geopolitical area: North-east -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.18) (0.16) 
Retrospective familiar economic evaluation (0-4) 0.41*** 0.28*** 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Government's evaluation on contextual economy (0-10) 0.49*** 0.52*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Stealth democracy scale (0-10) -0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Conspiracism scale (0-10) -0.26*** -0.25*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant -3.18*** -3.09*** 
 (0.38) (0.34) 
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.31 
Observations 1,952 2,314 
 
 
 
D - What items are used for the variable on liberal democratic support? It says it is 
inspired by the Hibbing/Theiss-Morse Stealth Democracy battery, but so what exactly 
are the questions? 
 
ANSWER: The items employed to measure liberal democratic support are the 
following:  
- Parties are necessary to defend special interests of groups and social classes.  
- Parties guarantee that people can participate to politics in Italy 
- Without parties there cannot be democracy 
The three items belong to the same battery and are measured on a 0-10 scale. We 
added a note in the manuscript (note 6) in which we report the text of the three items  
 
E - The controls for government evaluation and stealth democracy are good and help 
the case. I was wondering if the survey also has the traditional trust items 
(parties/parliament/government/…), which is a concept highly correlated with 
conspiracism but which seems a very plausible explanation for voting "No" in this 
referendum. If available, political trust should be controlled for. 
 
ANSWER: We agree with Reviewer 2, but unfortunately the ITANES pre-post 
Referendum panel does not include the traditional trust items. Therefore, we cannot 
estimate the relationship between conspiracism and vote choice in 2016 constitutional 
referendum by controlling for political trust. 
 
F - It would be good to see some more descriptives, especially of the conspiracy 
questions. What are the means and distributions of each item? 
 
ANSWER: As Reviewer 2 suggests, descriptives for any single item allow providing 
further evidence on the non-marginality of conspiracism. Descriptives are computed 
on the 2,843 individuals interviewed both in the pre- and in the post-referendum 
surveys (see note 5). On pages 15-16, after the text of every conspiracy question we 
reported the value of the mean, the percentage of respondents who provide answer 
from 6 to 10 (namely, percentage of believers in that conspiracy theory), and the 
number of valid cases. For any conspiracy item, the proportion of respondents who 
tend to believe is equal to at least one out of four. The range of the means of the 
answers to the six conspiracy items is between 2.95 (‘Vapor trails left by aircraft are 
actually chemical agents deliberately sprayed in a clandestine program directed by 
government officials’) and 5.45 (‘A relevant part of our lives is controlled by 
conspiracies organised by major powers’). 
 
